Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign: Historic Analysis from Ancient Greece and Rome to the Napoleonic Era and Gettysburg, Normandy, Yom Kippur War

Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign: Historic Analysis from Ancient Greece and Rome to the Napoleonic Era and Gettysburg, Normandy, Yom Kippur War

  • Author: Progressive Management
  • Type: DjVu format
  • Pages: none
  • ISBN: none
  • ASIN: 9781370778089
  • Edition Language: English


  • This excellent report, professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, addresses a question that is fundamental to the debate about the extent that airpower can function as a maneuver force in a theater campaign.The U.S.

    Air Force contends that airpower is a maneuver force and frequently turns to the 1991 Persian Gulf War for evidence in support of their position. Those critical of the Air Forces view argue that Operation Desert Storm was an aberration and charge that arguments based on that essentially unique event are suspect. Book Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign: Historic Analysis from Ancient Greece and Rome to the Napoleonic Era and Gettysburg, Normandy, Yom Kippur War Seeking to parry the charge of exceptionalism, Givens deliberately sets out to provide a more broadly grounded study that transcends the particular experience of Operation Desert Storm.Colonel Givens begins with a general examination of warfare from ancient Greece to the American Civil War in order to determine the essential functions of a maneuver force.

    He then examines three distinctly different air operations in reverse chronological order: airpower employment in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the use of airpower in conjunction with South Vietnamese ground forces to frustrate the Communist Easter offensive of 1972, and operations against the Wehrmacht during the 1944 Normandy campaign.

    The evidence in all three cases suggests that airpower can function as a maneuver force. The conclusion is—if capable of serving as a maneuver force, airpower can greatly enhance the joint theater campaign both independently and in cooperation with other maneuver forces.Chapter 1 – INTRODUCTION * Methodology * Clarifications * Notes * Chapter 2 – FUNCTIONS OF A MANEUVER FORCE * Ancient Greece: Shock Action through Direct Contact * Rome: A Maneuver Force Exerts a Zone of Influence over the Enemy * Neoclassical Period: A Maneuver Force Compels or Denies Battle * Napoleonic Era: A Maneuver Force Gains and Exploits a Position of Advantage * Maneuver Force Performance Characteristics * Gettysburg Campaign * Summary * Notes * Chapter 3 – 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR * Overview * Maneuver Force Characteristics of Israeli Air Operations * Summary * Notes * Chapter 4 – 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE * Overview * Air Campaign Phases Related to Maneuver Force Characteristics * Summary * Notes * Chapter 5 – NORMANDY CAMPAIGN * Overview * Maneuver Force Characteristics of Allied Airpower * Summary * Notes * Chapter 6 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS * Conclusions * Implications * Final Thoughts * Notes

    Communicating Airpower: Strategic Communication and the United States Air Force Since 9/11, Comparison to Navy Public Affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan, Foreign and Domestic Audiences, Tanker Scandal

    Communicating Airpower: Strategic Communication and the United States Air Force Since 9/11, Comparison to Navy Public Affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan, Foreign and Domestic Audiences, Tanker Scandal


    Communicating Airpower: Strategic Communication and the United States Air Force Since 9/11, Comparison to Navy Public Affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan, Foreign and Domestic Audiences, Tanker Scandal

     


    by
    Progressive Management

  • Author: Progressive Management
  • Type: Mobi type
  • Pages: none
  • ISBN: none
  • ASIN: 9781370881284
  • Edition Language: English


  • This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.

    During the Cold War, the Air Force had a fairly easy time explaining its mission to the American public. It also had a coherent public affairs structure to help execute that mission. The new threat environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, combined with steep personnel cuts to its public affairs community, have dramatically altered the communication challenge for the Air Force.

    To effectively operate in this new climate with an emphasis on strategic communication, the Air Force has tinkered with a few organizational models to strengthen the communication function.The Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) asked the knowledgeable Washington editor John A.

    Robinson to analyze Air Force communications and provide some lessons that might help the Air Force communicate with the nation. Robinson is the managing editor of Defense Daily and is also a lieutenant commander public affairs officer in the Navy Reserve. Book Communicating Airpower: Strategic Communication and the United States Air Force Since 9/11, Comparison to Navy Public Affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan, Foreign and Domestic Audiences, Tanker Scandal He has a bachelor of arts in government from the University of Notre Dame, a master of arts in international affairs from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and a master of arts in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.As the ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan drag on, perceptions of the Air Force contribution to those efforts and the larger global war on terrorism will play an increasing role in how it is understood by the American public as well as leaders in the Pentagon and Congress.

    Robinson concludes that the Air Force needs to redouble its communication efforts. It needs to abandon the vague theoretical construct of strategic communication, rebuild the public affairs community, and focus on better explaining the relevance of airpower in current and future wars.

    He feels that it was an important story to tell, not only for the Airmen proudly defending the nation but also for the public, whose support is crucial. AFRI collected these thoughts from Robinson in order to distribute them to Air Force public affairs offices and those most affected by and interested in his observations.INTRODUCTION * A BRIEF HISTORY OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION * AIR FORCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION EFFORTS * AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: US NAVY PUBLIC AFFAIRS * RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION EFFORTS